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Searching for Eastern's Bottom Line 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Over the last two years labor unions have faced escalating demands for concessions and give-
backs. To counter the spread of concession fever, many unions are trying to develop a more sophisticated 
picture of a company's financial condition and overall strategy. First and foremost they are taking a closer 
look at the factors that determine a company's bottom line. The underlying assumption is that 
management uses financial accounting gimmicks to "reduce" profits and justify concessions. 
This is not an easy task, primarily because the expertise and data needed to investigate a company's 
performance is not readily available to most unions, especially at the regional or local level. In-house 
capacity in this area usually resides at the national level where in-depth research on specific companies is 
either inaccessible or nonexistent. Very few accounting, consulting or research firms serve unions; most 
have a strong pro-business bias that accompanies their reliance on large corporate accounts. As a result, 
most unions stand at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to refuting company claims of hardship. This 
weakens both the leadership and membership, and makes it difficult for unions to present their case to 
the press and the public. 
At Eastern Air Lines, two unions used very different approaches to analyze the company's financial 
condition. The pilots hired a prestigious corporate accounting firm. A partner in this firm flew down to 
Eastern's Miami headquarters for a half day presentation.In a subsequent 30-minute oral report to the 
union leadership he "confirmed" that Eastern was in bad shape, thereby justifying concession demands. 
Nothing was put in writing for the membership and the fee was $5000. 
IAM District 100 took a different approach. The leadership decided first to educate themselves about 
Eastern's finances in order to independently assess the company's condition. They realized that this 
required a solid understanding of basic accounting principles. For guidance, they turned to experts not 
beholden to company clients. Finally the IAM leadership educated the total membership about what they 
had learned. 
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Searching for 
Eastern's Bottom Line 
by Mike Locker and 
Steve Abrecht 
Over the last two years labor unions have faced escalating demands 
for concessions and give-backs. To counter the spread of concession 
fever, many unions are trying to develop a more sophisticated picture 
of a company's financial condition and overall strategy. First and 
foremost they are taking a closer look at the factors that determine 
a company's bottom line. The underlying assumption is that manage-
ment uses financial accounting gimmicks to "reduce" profits and 
justify concessions. 
This is not an easy task, primarily because the expertise and data 
needed to investigate a company's performance is not readily 
available to most unions, especially at the regional or local level. In-
house capacity in this area usually resides at the national level where 
in-depth research on specific companies is either inaccessible or non-
existent. Very few accounting, consulting or research firms serve 
unions; most have a strong pro-business bias that accompanies their 
reliance on large corporate accounts. As a result, most unions stand 
at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to refuting company claims 
of hardship. This weakens both the leadership and membership, and 
makes it difficult for unions to present their case to the press and 
the public. 
At Eastern Air Lines, two unions used very different approaches 
to analyze the company's financial condition. The pilots hired a 
prestigious corporate accounting firm. A partner in this firm flew 
down to Eastern's Miami headquarters for a half day presentation. 
Mike Locker and Steve Abrecht are founders of the Corporate Data 
Exchange and, more recently of Locker/Abrecht Associates. They 
were the chief financial analysts for IAM District 100 in the negotia-
tions with Eastern. 
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In a subsequent 30-minute oral report to the union leadership he 
"confirmed" that Eastern was in bad shape, thereby justifying 
concession demands. Nothing was put in writing for the membership 
and the fee was $5000. 
IAM District 100 took a different approach. The leadership decided 
first to educate themselves about Eastern's finances in order to 
independently assess the company's condition. They realized that 
this required a solid understanding of basic accounting principles. 
For guidance, they turned to experts not beholden to company 
clients. Finally the IAM leadership educated the total membership 
about what they had learned. 
Starting with Basics 
Most people think of profits, revenues, assets and other measures 
of economic activity in the same way as they think of their bank 
account and personal possessions. Inflows and outflows and the cash 
value of all possessions held at a particular moment in time deter-
mine one's financial well-being. But corporate accounting creates 
timing differences between cash transactions and their reflection in 
the income statement and the bottom line. The accounting profes-
sion has also spawned a large number of rules which grant manage-
ment considerable discretion in the timing and method for recording 
transactions on their books.. .all of which is perfectly legal. In order 
to clarify the ambiguities of corporate accounting for the union leader-
ship, Locker/Abrecht Associates conducted two seminars for the 
bargaining committees of IAM District 100 and Flight Attendants 
Local 553 of the Transport Workers Union. 
The seminars were conducted in September 1981 and May 1982. 
For two full days members of these bargaining committees took time 
off from their jobs to comb through and digest the complete financial 
statements of their company. This was no mere educational exercise. 
For four years they and other Eastern workers had lost part of their 
wages because management's reported figure for "net income" did 
not equal 2% of "total revenues." Through the Variable Earnings 
Program Eastern's management unintentionally prompted the union 
to take a closer look at its financial statements because its members' 
wages were directly tied to Eastern's accounting methods. The union 
now realized that there was more to "net income" than netting the 
opening and closing balance of a check book. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP for short, are 
the recognized basis upon which all publicly-traded corporations 
must present their accounts. The name in itself is enough to raise 
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tself is enough to raise 
eyebrows. Our first task in the seminars was to explain these 
principles of corporate (accrual) accounting and erase common 
misunderstandings about income statements and balance sheets. 
Revenue recognition, the matching of revenues and expenses, 
depreciation and amortization, the determination of period income, 
the valuation of assets and liabilities, the going concern principle 
and others were all concepts which became building blocks to 
analaysis of Eastern's financial condition. 
Our intention in defining basic terminology and principles was 
threefold: 
1. to provide each union leader and the membership with the 
necessary tools to evaluate Eastern's financial statements 
independently. 
2. to clarify what conclusions can be drawn from information 
which is publicly available as opposed to conclusions which could 
only be reached by someone with privileged access to company 
records. 
3. to communicate the ambiguities of accounting standards and 
the parameters within which management can choose between 
alternative accounting principles, can change accounting estimates 
and can time extraordinary events, all of which affect its financial 
statements and, most importantly for the workers, its "net income." 
Management Discretion 
Two items best exemplify the impact of management's discretion 
on the public record of its financial and operating condition: deprecia-
tion of flight equipment and pension costs. 
68 UP AGAINST the GLOOM and DOOM! 
In the case of depreciation, management estimates at the time a 
plane is acquired how many years it will remain in service and what 
value it will have after that period is completed. Two companies 
having identical fleets and the same operating revenues, but using 
different depreciation schedules, will report different net incomes. 
The shorter the depreciation schedule, the lower the net income. 
Thus Delta with a strong bottom line depreciates a Boeing 727 over 
10 years whereas Pan American with substantial losses uses 19 years. 
As an airline's fortunes change, it is common for management to 
change the depreciable life of an aircraft. The seminar participants 
quickly realized that Eastern's management could arbitrarily affect 
its net income by altering the estimated life of its fleet. 
The second item, pension costs, is also subject to an educated 
guess. In this area management draws on the obscure services of 
actuaries to predict life expectancy, employee turnover, salary levels 
and interest rates a decade or more into the future. Not surprisingly 
their recommendations vary considerably from company to company, 
but appear directly co] 
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a company can lower its pension costs and raise its net income. 
In the seminars, we examined each item in Eastern's financial state-
ments line by line, working our way through the balance sheets, the 
income statement, the statement of changes in financial position and 
the explanatory notes. Key items were examined for trends over time 
and through standard financial ratios to assess the company's perform-
ance. These ratios were compared to Eastern's primary competitor, Delta 
Air Lines, to evaluate Eastern's performance within its industry and 
market. We noted, for example, that while in 1978 Eastern's labor costs 
were proportionately higher than Delta's—43% of total revenues versus 
40.3%—by 1980 Eastern had cut its labor costs to 38.6%, reflecting 
the cutbacks at Eastern due to the Variable Earnings Program. 
Another important thrust of our seminars was to place Eastern 
within the context of the corporate power structure which governs 
many decisions affecting operations and long-term strategy. Because 
of the size of Eastern's debt, its banks and other lenders were the 
major focus of our attention. By year-end 1982 Eastern's long-term 
debt had passed the $2 billion mark, or 63.8% of its assets. Interest 
expense had risen to 4.7% of revenues, while Delta's was only 0.6%, 
a difference of $155.9 million, more than double Eastern's net loss 
for 1982. Had Eastern's debt been as low as Delta's, EAL would have 
reported net income of $81 million in that year. 
The weight of the lenders in Eastern's financing made it clear that 
they held veto power over important decisions. Moreover, gains in 
Eastern's financial performance were being syphoned off by the 
lenders. The unions realized that they were bargaining with the 
banks. While management insisted on cutbacks in labor costs, no 
one dared suggest that the lenders take a cut in the rate of return 
on their loans to Eastern. 
We also studied Eastern's major suppliers, particularly aircraft 
manufacturers. Not surprisingly Eastern's lead banks are also 
Boeing's. When Boeing was desperate for a large initial order of its 
new 757 plane, Eastern was the first to jump on the bandwagon. 
At year-end 1982 Eastern had received 2 new 757's, ordered 25 more 
and held options for another 24, a considerable number in the light 
of its 'heavy debt load. 
This overview of Eastern's accounting methods, financial condition, 
operating performance and business environment was the starting 
point for the union's independent evaluation of Eastern's current 
health and long-term prospects. 
* 
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Looking for Eastern's Crown Jewels 
This analysis, however, was not sufficient to answer all the union's 
questions about the airline's financial condition. In fact many new 
questions were raised, some arising from the fact that figures 
reported to the SEC and CAB differ because the two agencies use 
different accounting principles and reporting requirements. More im-
portantly the union now realized that many issues related to manage-
ment productivity, labor costs, creditor relations, fuel and equipment-
purchasing agreements, and financial projections could not be 
answered through publicly available information. 
In the course of the next year and a half the union gradually broke 
through the barrier of public information and gained access to con-
fidential documents about the company's operations. Traditionally 
employers open their books to a union only when they plead poverty. 
Eastern, however, had always maintained that its books were available 
to the union. This unusual policy had never been fully tested. The 
union's new access to inside information evolved in three steps: 
1. Price Waterhouse. Following the first seminar, the company ar-
ranged for a meeting between its independent auditor, Price 
Waterhouse (PW), the union leadership and ourselves. This meeting 
helped to clarify certain issues, particularly with regards to discrepan-
cies between SEC and CAB data. Answers to more substantive ques-
tions were promised by PW at a future date but were never received. 
Subsequent research made the shortcomings of such an approach 
apparent. On the basis of SEC and CAB data, we often could only 
speculate about the real problem which underlay specific figures. 
If our questions were not phrased accurately or broadly enough, the 
auditor could easily evade the real problem. 
In one specific case the union had noted a rapid increase in the 
inventory of spare parts. We asked PW whether their audit had found 
any problem with the inventory. Their answer was negative, but what 
they failed to disclose, and we only discovered a year and a half later, 
was that the board of directors had recently hired the consulting firm 
of Booze Allen & Hamilton to investigate how Eastern could reduce 
an excess of $100 million in its spare parts inventory. 
2. Bargaining with the Lenders. In December 1981, the I AM 
bargaining committee met for the first time with representatives of 
EAUs major lenders and underwriter. This meeting was important 
because it gave the union its first direct line of communication to 
parties which our research indicated possessed great influence over 
corporate affairs. Eastern favored the meeting for its own reason: it 
hoped to frighten union negotiators by demonstrating the banks' 
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power to cut off Eastern's financing. At this meeting, the unions 
received from the company the confidential "Financial presentation" 
which management prepares quarterly for its lenders. This docu-
ment contains a wealth of information not readily available to the 
public. It largely focuses on projections as opposed to SEC and CAB 
public data which almost exclusively covers past activity. It also details 
all the liquidity and solvency ratios mandated by Eastern's loan 
agreements. 
In March 1983 the projections showed substantial net income from 
1983 through 1987. For the first time the union got a glimpse of 
management's optimism about the company's future and not just 
its pessimism about past losses. This bright picture was in sharp 
contrast to the gloom and doom to which the workers and the public 
were being subjected. This information proved to be an important 
asset to the union in its contract negotiations. 
Borman Opens a Pandora's Box. The third step was the most critical 
to the union's bargaining position. In February 1983, only 4 weeks 
before the strike deadline, we received a call from Charlie Bryan, 
President of IAM District 100, with the surprising news that Frank 
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Borman would open all of Eastern's books to the union. This last 
minute offer, apparently aimed at heading off a strike and pressuring 
the Machinists into accepting its latest terms, was unprecedented. 
By opening its books, EAL wanted to prove to the union simply 
that its SEC documents were accurate. The union had never 
suggested that this was not the case. But the union wanted access 
to additional information on the company which would indicate 
whether it could afford an industry standard wage. It also wanted 
to evaluate independently management's business plan and what 
it meant for the workforce. 
As a result we drew up an extensive list of documents which we 
would examine at the company's headquarters over a period of three 
to five days. Because we had to confine our search to the time 
available, we included documents which would reflect the opinions 
of other parties close to the company, such as the auditor, creditors 
and members of the board of directors. 
Our investigation was prefaced by a thorough review of reports 
on Eastern and the industry by Wall Street analysts. These gave us 
an independent assessment of Eastern's prospects. The optimistic 
projections in the latest and most extensive report were helpful in 
guiding our line of questioning. 
The company came forward with the vast majority of the 
documents we requested, with two important exceptions. The 
auditor's working papers, the equivalent of a road map and diary 
of the audit, were considered the property of Price Waterhouse, 
which fell back on self-prescribed professional standards and its own 
firm policy to preclude our inspection of its contents. Data on the 
hierarchy and salary levels of EAL management and non-contract 
employees were also withheld because management felt the IAM 
would use it against them, presumably in an on-going attempt to 
organize non-union employees. 
We were not permitted to photocopy some important documents 
we did inspect and we were unable to examine some material 
thoroughly because of its sheer volume. For the purposes of the task 
at hand, however, we were able to review the company's records 
sufficiently to draw important conclusions for the union and point 
to areas requiring additional investigation. We were assisted in this 
task by Randy Barber. 
The report concluded that Eastern was entering a profitable period 
which could be sustained if management moderated its plane 
acquisitions program. At a meeting between the union leadership, 
! 
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the union leadership, 
the company's top management, including the President, Frank 
Borman, and ourselves, Eastern executives were given the 
opportunity to comment on the report and refute the findings. Their 
observations were incorporated in the final document. Although 
management had originally required that the report remain confiden-
tial, they reversed their decision and authorized its release. The union 
quickly distributed copies to all shop stewards, who were instructed 
to inform the members of its findings. 
Conclusions 
Our research on Eastern Air Lines and our access to privileged 
documents led to the following conclusions: 
A. In addition to their traditional activities, unions must carefully 
scrutinize the financial condition and bottom line of the companies 
they deal with. It is important that they do this on a regular basis 
in order to forestall impending disasters and dispel the crisis 
atmosphere fostered by management. 
B. To bargain more effectively unions must have regular access to 
more detailed data on a company's performance than is generally 
found in publicly available documents. In effect unions must have 
the same standing as creditors in gaining access to inside informa-
tion, a step which can be achieved through changes in federal labor 
law. For instance, SEC documents must be complemented by data 
which break down summary financial information into its component 
parts, much in the way management accounting permits corporate 
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executives to track the performance of divisions, products, profit 
centers, individual managers, etc. The union must also have access 
to projections, capital investment plans and financing programs 
which will affect the company's long-term competitive position, 
growth and employment levels. 
C. A key factor in evaluating the true condition of a company is 
to follow the opinions of Wall Street analysts and informed reporters 
in the business and trade press. While obviously anti- labor, these 
sources offer a more probing and incisive analysis, which is often 
at odds with management's. 
D. One method of gaining access to detailed insider information 
is to have a representative on the board of directors. From this 
position a union representative can also capture a sense of the debate 
among board members, the range of options considered on any 
particular matter, and the weight attributed to the opinions of 
different directors. Minutes of the meetings of the board of directors, 
to which we gained access at Eastern, provided only final resolu-
tions and few insights. 
E. Unions must develop a capability to digest this financial infor-
mation either by developing internal expertise or hiring outside 
consultants. Without such expertise and without a cumulative 
knowledge of the company they are researching, they can't take 
advantage of an open books policy. If unions use outside consultants, 
the leadership must nevertheless become versed in the data and must 
disseminate the research findings to the membership in a regular 
and timely fashion through organized channels of communication. 
F. In crisis situations, rapid access to and quick dissemination of 
financial information can play a major role in orienting the member-
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